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In recent years open innovation has been increasingly recognized as an important way of 
speeding up the innovation process. However, managers are concerned for new vulnerabilities, as 
their companies are becoming increasingly dependent on outside sources. The present paper 
presents the results of a survey among 32 managers of 12 failed inter-company collaborations. 
Based on the results it is concluded that cooperation clearly has its limits. The soft aspects proved 
much tougher to handle then the hard aspects of collaboration, but relationship harmony is not a 
goal in itself. Commitment counts, but clear upfront negotiations are a prerequisite for success. 
 





Given the rapid development of technologies, the fast changing consumption trends and the ever 
increasing competition, even a large multinational firm’s competitive advantage can only be 
temporary. As a consequence, firms have to innovate continuously in order to remain at the top of 
their industries. The pressure to do more with less inexorably pushes these companies to focus on 
their unique, hard to imitate and distinctive core competencies, continually nurturing and 
enhancing them, while abandoning those activities in which they do not posses distinctive 
competencies. In recent years, open innovation has been recognized as an important way of 
speeding up the innovation process. The capability of building and maintaining inter-
organisational network relationships, such as joint ventures, license agreements, supplier-
customer partnerships and strategic alliances are increasingly viewed as key to sustained 
competitive advantage.  
 
These external relationships might be a reasonable response to the business pressures, but, at the 
same time, they may create new long-term dependencies and vulnerabilities, as companies are 
becoming increasingly dependent on outside sources for their technological advances (e.g. 
Millson et al., 1996, Jonash, 1996). For instance, if industry is going to entrust critical parts of its 
research to outsiders, there must be confidence that timing to produce results will be respected. 
Managers are concerned about security, cost-effectiveness and relevance of results, risk of 
knowledge spill-over and high co-ordination costs. They are also afraid that working closely with 
network partners will reduce the possibilities to relate to companies outside the network. In 
addition, even large innovative, so called prospector, firms, still have only limited experience in 
implementing open innovation concepts. Questions like: ‘How can we open up our own 
innovation process without loosing our intellectual properties? How can we convince our 
partners to share their core capabilities with us? make many companies hesitant to shift to more 
open forms of innovation. Lichtenthaler (2008) concludes from a study of 154 middle and large 
technology-oriented firms in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, whose main business is internal 
technology exploitation that many firms still pursue traditional closed approaches to innovation. 
His results suggest that Open innovation is at the moment mainly driven by larger companies, 
and that firms that are diversified at the product level tend to externally leverage technologies 
more actively than focused firms. 
 
It is the objective of the present paper to address these questions by presenting the results of a 
survey among the managers of 12 failed collaborations. Thirty-two half structured interviews 
were held with general and R&D managers of twelve leading companies in technological 
collaboration about the complications and pitfalls encountered. 
 
We have structured the paper as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical foundation of the 
study. Section 3 describes the study sample and the methods of data analysis. In Section 4 the 





According to Chesbrough (2003), innovative companies increasingly realize that the ‘closed’ 
model of innovation, in which the internal R&D department exclusively provides for new 
products and processes to foster the company’s growth, does not work any more in today’s highly 
dynamic business environment. As Quinn (2000) points out, in order to compete in current 
markets, cooperation within a network of partners is becoming more and more essential. As 
Gambardella (1992) states: To be part of a network, and to be able to effectively exploit the 
information that circulates in the network, has become even more valuable than being able to 
generate new knowledge autonomously. The ability to identify potential network partners and 
maintain existing relations with current partners are thus of crucial importance. Indeed 
Caloghirou et al. (2004), found in a European survey of over 500 firms in the chemical and 
telecommunication industry, that interacting with external partners enables a firm to access a 
variety of new knowledge and that interfirm linkages seem to promote innovative performance. 
 
Chatterji (1996) divided the broad terrain of business relationships from outright acquisitions of 
small companies, via exclusive licensing of specific technologies, joint ventures, minority 
equities, options for future licenses and joint development to R&D contracts and seed funding of 
exploratory research at universities, independent research organisations and start-up companies. 
His study concentrated on technological collaborations (i.e. joint ventures, joint developments 
and R&D contracts) for a definite period, to achieve a common objective. These might or might 
not shift into long-term alliances. The focus is on the complications and pitfalls encountered by 
the management of the 'leading company'. The leading company brings in the original concept for 
the co-operation, where it is then further developed in co-operation with the partners, which add 
varying degrees of value (Lorenzi and Baden-Fuller 1995). 
 
Before the concept of Open Innovation as such emerged, ideas about the importance of 
absorbing external knowledge and disseminating and exploiting internal knowledge that would 
otherwise remain unutilized were formulated in the fields of industrial dynamics and applied 
evolutionary economics. Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) concept of absorptive capacity addressed 
the particular competence that companies build in R&D, not only for managing internal 
innovation but also for being able to access and absorb external ideas, science and other kinds of 
knowledge inputs to innovation. Rosenberg (1982), Lundvall (1992), Pavitt (1998), Omta (1995) 
and Von Hippel (1988) among others, have addressed the interactive, cross-disciplinary and 
(mostly) inter-organizational nature of innovative learning. 
 
What Chesbrough (2003) has added in his book “Open Innovation”, apart from offering a new 
term, is a more comprehensive and systematic study of the “internal” corporate modes of 
managing such externally oriented processes of innovation. He has more generally pointed to the 
emergence of a fairly radical organizational innovation in the way large high-tech corporations 
engage in technological innovation, from an introvert and proprietary to a (much more) extrovert 
and open paradigm. Although up to now, Open Innovation concepts have been regarded as 
relevant primarily to ‘high-technology’ industries, such as the ICT and pharmaceutical industry, 
Chesbrough et al. (2006) conclude that Open Innovation has utility beyond high tech industries 
and will become important also for more traditional and mature industries. But he has also argued 
that the specific level and mode of open/closed innovation is contingent on the particular 
industry. Gassmann (2006) identified the following factors that might make open innovation 
more/less appropriate as a strategic tool for innovation.  
1. Globalization. According to Gassmann (2006) globalization tends to foster open innovation 
because it is characterized by higher mobility of capital, lower logistics costs, more efficient 
ICT, and increased market homogeneity across different countries. As a consequence, entry 
barriers for new international competitors are lowered, and this provides the companies that 
can innovate faster and are able to adapt better with an opportunity for competitive advantage. 
Anderson and Tushman (1990) argue, that Global industries favor open innovation models 
because this enables them to achieve economies of scale more swiftly than the traditional 
closed model and provides them with an opportunity to promote standards and dominant 
designs . 
2. Technology intensity. The fact that in most industries, technology intensity has increased to 
such a degree that not even the largest companies can cope with or afford to develop 
technology on their own, also acts as a strong incentive for open innovation. Companies in 
high-tech sectors (e.g., semiconductors) show a higher propensity to cooperate, extensively 
using external sources to support product development in an environment characterized by 
rapid technological change (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003).  
3. Technology fusion. Technologies are increasing morphing into new fields such as 
mechatronics, optronics and bioinformatics (Kodama, 1992). Consequently, industry borders 
are shifting or even disappearing. For example, IBM is ranked eighth in a list of the world’s 
largest holders of biotechnology patents. The more interdisciplinary cross border research is 
required, the less a single company’s existing capabilities are sufficient to provide successful 
innovations.  
4. New business models. With the rapid shift of many industry and technology borders, new 
business opportunities arise. For example, the multimedia industry brings together firms 
active in sectors as different as hardware, software, telecommunication, information and 
entertainment. Consequently, new alliances have been formed, leading to complementary 
partnerships, e.g. Vodaphone-Swisscom, Sony-Ericsson or Sony-BMG. The main motives for 
these alliances are the sharing of risks, the pooling of complementary competencies, and the 
realization of synergies. Companies also tend to acquire those innovations and technologies 
that fit their business model. For example, by sourcing technology and know how externally, 
Procter & Gamble generated new businesses with a US$5bn turnover during the last four 
years. 
5. Knowledge leveraging. Knowledge has become the most important resource for firms. 
Despite discussions regarding tacit knowledge that is bound to specific persons (e.g. Nonaka, 
1994), the mobility of knowledge has increased over the last decades. Open source software 
development can have thousands of decentralized programmers working on one platform and 
has become possible because of the special character of software: high separability and 
codability as well as its high knowledge intensity. Developing a car engine in open 
innovation modes is much more difficult – at least in the physical prototype stage. New ICT, 
especially the Internet, accelerated the knowledge diffusion process and increased the 
personal mobility of knowledge workers. Many specialized knowledge workers (e.g., 
freelancers, consultants or part-time engineers) make a living as portfolio workers, offering 
their service to different organizations at the same time. Instead of hiring the best engineers 
internally, companies are forced to act as knowledge brokers. New capabilities and 
organizational modes are needed to cope with this outside-in thinking.  
 
 
3 Study sample and research methods 
 
Thirtytwo half structured interviews were held with general and R&D managers of twelve 
leading companies in technological collaboration about the complications and pitfalls 
encountered. All managers had been actively involved in the preparation and/or the execution of 
the technological collaborations at issue. 
Five collaborations took place in the energy sector. Three of them were initiated by different 
Dutch power plants and a central research institution concentrating on energy and environmental 
issues. The other two were initiated by the largest gas distributor in the Netherlands. The first 
collaboration was directed towards the development of a new simulation-based controlling 
system for power plants. Two others were directed towards the development of advanced 
controlling systems for small-scale power generation. The fourth concentrated on the 
development of environmental friendly wood and coal based energy generation. The fifth was 
concerned with advanced motor management. The partner(s) in the first collaboration was a US 
software company; in the second a Dutch manufacturer of energy controlling systems, in the third 
(another) US software firm and a Swedish wood supplier; in the fourth, three US power plant 
manufacturers; and in the fifth a Dutch manufacturer of motor systems. 
 
In addition, three collaborations took place in the automotive industry. The first was a co-
development of a new coating for motor bodies between two automotive companies in Germany 
and France, a large Dutch steel company and a Dutch-based multinational chemical 
conglomerate. The second was a long-term R&D collaboration of six motor body companies, 
currently concentrating on the possibilities of converting aluminium bodies. The third was a 
collaboration between a US car manufacturer and a multinational supplier of components. 
 
The ninth collaboration was a co-development between the largest copier manufacturer in the 
Netherlands and its main suppliers to develop a new product family of high-end copiers. The 
tenth collaboration concerned a co-development of a multinational food processing company with 
a supplier of flavour ingredients to develop a series of new healthy products that despite their 
lower salt and fat contents retain an excellent taste. 
 
The last two collaborations were collaborative networks, the first in the field of software 
development and the other in the electronics industry. A world-wide operating software 
company, based in Ireland, daughter of a large multinational company, worked closely together 
in supplier-customer partnerships with their clients to provide them with tailor made software 
solutions. The other collaboration was a university-industry collaborative network in the area of 
high performance parallel and optical computing of four university departments in Great Britain, 




The interviews revealed that many complications and pitfalls were encountered in the different 
open innovation projects. R&D partnerships are mostly directed towards new technologies and/or 
markets. Therefore, careful upfront study is essential for a well-balanced assessment of the 
technological and business opportunities. In two cases the partners were so enthusiastic about the 
collaboration as such, that without further study the business opportunities were considered to be 
good. The respondents stated that, although no market turned out to exist for the developed 
product, there was gain of beneficial experience in terms of organisational learning and technical 
know how. MacLaghlan (1995) comments, that where termination of an R&D project can create 
trauma inside the R&D organisation of an individual company, this is even more so in a 
collaborative effort. Bruce et al. (1995) point in the same direction, by commenting that the 
collaboration as such might establish its own agenda. The overriding desire of the partners to 
ensure that the collaboration will be successful may cause that the partners become blind to 
technological and market reality.  
 
In addition, insufficient monitoring of the R&D environment led to overlooking of obvious 
partners. This is often caused by insufficient management commitment to finding a partner. In 
one case it took 5 years (!) to find a partner with the required competencies. The resulting 
partnership missed the business opportunity, because the market had changed in the 5 year's 
period. In another case a leading university department in the country of the lead company was 
overlooked for more than half a year, because the company was searching world-wide, ignoring 
the possibility of finding excellence 'around-the-corner'. In two cases the technological capability 
and the financial resources of the partner turned out to be insufficient to conduct its part of the 
collaboration successfully.  
 
Another major problem that emerged from the interviews was that the technological collaboration 
had evolved in a merely ad hoc way, while the interests of the company were insufficiently 
secured. In five collaborations, a lack of consistency with corporate interests was mentioned to 
have caused (severe) problems later in the collaboration. This included lack of clear agreements 
about the division of the financial and R&D efforts over the partners, and insufficient clarity 
about the way the collaboration should be organised and managed. The omission with the most 
severe consequences, however, was not putting a clause about the distribution of the potential 
gains into the contract. The partner stepped out of the collaboration to use the knowledge 
competitively. 
A number of respondents stated, however, that, because in R&D partnerships the gains are often 
uncertain, and unexpected gains arise, it is very difficult or even impossible to capture them all in 
contracts. Too detailed contracts are also contra-productive. In two collaborations the respondents 
indicated that their (American) counterparts showed up at the constitutional meeting with their 
corporate lawyers and fist-sized contracts. This deterred the Europeans and extended the 
negotiations considerably. 
 
However, the most important problem encountered was fear and distrust. Seven out of the twelve 
technological collaborations suffered of this at any time during the collaboration. Three 
collaborations actually failed, because one of the partners was more interested in the short term 
exploitation of strategic information than in the success of the joint programme. In 
pharmaceutical industry, where concentration tendencies are widespread (Omta, 1995), fear was 
expressed that the current R&D partner might later merge with a competitor, which could lead to 
drainage of sensitive information. One of the respondents of university-industry collaboration 
expressed the fear of leaking out of strategic information, because a number of the graduate 
students of the university department got jobs in competitors' R&D. Furthermore, respondents 
warn for asymmetric technological collaborations between large and small companies. The small 
partner may fear (or hope), that if the technological collaboration will turn out successfully, it 
will loose independence, being taken over by the financially stronger partner. 
 
In three cases inter-cultural problems were encountered. In one case, language problems and 
cultural differences hindered open communication between Japanese and European companies. 
But interestingly, also with American companies problems arose. The problems caused by 
differences in negotiating culture were already mentioned. In two cases there were also 
complains about lack of openness and the provision of scanty, not up-to-date information by the 
American counterparts. 
 
The partners of large R&D networks tend to underestimate the communication and co-ordination 
problems and costs which are encountered in large collaborations. Four large R&D partnerships 
ended in overrunning their budget. Obviously, management still encounters difficulties in coping 
with the co-ordination of networks. The central problem in this respect is the absence of a 
steering agency. It is the network, or rather the type of the structure of the network, which, to a 
large extent, determines how actors work together. Consequently, executing R&D within the 
confines of a network requires different steering solutions than the execution of in-house R&D. 
Moreover, the fit between the nature of the research problems to be addressed in the network and 
the type of the structure of the network is not always self-evident. Quite often the type of 
structure of the network is not explicitly chosen but merely an accidental choice, e.g. based upon 
previous experiences, as was found in a study of upstream R&D co-operation between firms and 
knowledge institutions within the biotech programme (Cabo et al., 1996).  
 
The complications and pitfalls encountered in our study show that external relationships require 
constant management attention. In the following some managerial approaches are presented for 
each phase of the collaboration, which might be effective in reducing the social liability of these 
network relations. 
 
A number of problems could have been avoided if the technology forecasting was more carefully 
assessed. Companies need to establish robust technology forecasting systems, which express the 
technology needs for the next 5 to 10 years, and monitor and interpret the developments in the 
different technologies, the emerging trends in customer needs and competitor actions. Based on 
these forecasting activities ‘technology road maps’ can be set up, which link the future product 
plans to the technologies required achieving them. Many authors (e.g. Hamel et al. 1989, Roussel 
et al. 1991) have emphasised that firms should develop only few strategic technological 
capabilities and should outsource the other ones. The emerging role of R&D management is to 
balance the internal and external technological capabilities, by identifying the projects which are 
feasible to take out, and match these with external sources. Via management tools, such as the 
outsourcing and partnering matrix (Harris et al., 1996), the firms can decide which technologies 
should be developed in-house, which in collaboration with one or more partners and which 
technologies are better outsourced. 
 
Erens et al. (1996) concluded, based on a study of 50 companies in Europe, US and the Far East 
(including Airbus, Boeing, Canon, Hitachi, IBM, Matsushita Philips and Toyota), that many 
leading companies are too selfish in the search of an appropriate partner. They emphasise that 
companies should not only look at what they need and want from a potential partner, but also 
what they can deliver to a partner in terms of skills, market access and economies of scale etc. In 
addition they emphasise that the companies are too much oriented toward the hard aspects of the 
collaboration, whereas a good match of the soft aspects, including business culture and chemistry 
of (top) managers are far more important for successful co-operation. Bailey et al. (1996), based 
on a study of 70 UK based companies in different industry sectors, also conclude that selecting 
partners for collaboration on technical merits alone, how important as such, is clearly a sub-
optimal solution. Interestingly, relying on the partner's track record in previous collaborations 
turned out to be a poor basis for collaborator selection, as well. The authors even call this: A 
recipe for disappointment. In short, a company has to be very careful in the selection of the 
potential partner(s). An ideal partner should: 
• have an interest in and expect equal advantages of the collaboration. 
• Have complementary technological capabilities and knowledge. 
• Be capable and willing to share financial risks. 
• Have no record of opportunistic behaviour in former collaborations. 
• Have a business culture in favour of collaboration, with open communication and a quality 
vision. Its management should not be afraid of loosing some of its authority.  
 
Less suitable partners are: 
• partners with comparable core business and/or geographical markets. Security conflicts may 
easily arise where partners operate as direct competitors in other markets. 
• Partners with business cultures which differ too far. Lorange et al. (1992) also identify 
compatible organizational cultures as being important, encompassing similar perception of 
the environment, organizational values and operational routines. 
• Depending companies. This finding is in line with that of Saxenian (1990). The high-tech 
Silicon Valley companies ensure that they receive no more than 20% of any supplier's output 
to ensure that they do not become too dependent on external partners. 
 
The complications learned that too extensive contractual arrangements should be avoided, 
because they are likely to be interpreted as distrust in the good intentions of the partner. 
However, we don't want go as far as Wolff (1994), who states that contractual arrangements are 
only important in so far as they define the terms under which a partner may exit the collaboration. 
According to Chiesa and Manzini (1996), the partners should agree upon - the objectives of the 
collaboration, i.e. the expected results; the time required for the project; the expected contribution 
of each partner, in terms of time and resources; the organisational structure and the role of each 
partner (allocation of tasks); the co-ordination mechanisms; and criteria for assessing the 
collaboration's performance and evaluating results. In accordance with Chiesa and Manzini's 
conclusions, our respondents indicated that a contractual arrangement should minimal codify: 
• the financial and personal responsibilities of the partners. 
• The division of the possible gains among the partners. 
• The way of knowledge protection, including patent and trade secret rights and confidentiality 
agreements. 
• Criteria for measuring and monitoring progress, so that deviations can be identified and 
potential problems can be overcome. This includes milestones and deadlines of the project, 
responsibilities and accountability of the project team and the founding of a steering 
committee. For example, a contract between the biotechnology company Immunex and the 
pharmaceutical company SmithKline Beecham included a list of the principal scientists who 
would be responsible, a detailed schedule of at least weekly telephone conferences, and a 
provision for at least quarterly joint meetings (Leonard-Barton, 1995). 
• Penalty clauses to discourage opportunistic behaviour. 
 
 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
 
Based on our results it can be concluded that high technology cooperation clearly has its limits. 
Therefore it should start small with a limited scope and time frame. It is important to realize that 
the further the partners’ competitive goals diverge, the more their alliance potential converges. 
The soft aspects proved much tougher to handle then the hard aspects of collaboration, but 
relationship harmony is not a goal in itself. Commitment counts, but clear upfront negotiations 
are often a prerequisite for success. 
 
The results clearly show that partnership management is to a great extent management of trust, 
and goes far beyond signing of confidentiality agreements and agree to guidelines. A 
collaboration to be effective requires the bridging across different business cultures and lines of 
responsibility in the participating companies. Lewis (1998) states that lack of trust is the major 
reason why many R&D managers don't think their alliances are working as well as they should. 
Based on a study of 84 alliances, Lorange et al. (1992) conclude that trust and commitment are 
necessary conditions for long-term collaboration. Alliances have to be designed to create win-win 
situations; rather than some form of a zero-sum game otherwise they will certainly fail (Rai et 
al.,1996). Bruce et al. (1995) comment, that the creation of a climate of trust might appear to be 
in direct conflict with the notion of establishing limits to the knowledge exchanged. It is the 
challenge for the partners to find the critical balance of openness and confidentiality. It seems 
feasible that over time, as trust is build up, the need to limit the scope of the collaboration might 
decrease. Trust is build-up by ensuring that partners receive suitable rewards for their efforts. To 
show their interest in the venture, each partner should contribute high-quality R&D staff. During 
the whole co-operation it is critical that the partners keep each other informed to what they are 
doing. The benefits of frequent communication in building up mutual understanding and in 
checking on the progress of the collaboration saves time and costs by preventing far more costly 
adjustments later in the collaboration. To communicate frequently, sending all relevant memo's 
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